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SUMMARY 
The objective of this report and the surveys upon which it is based is to help rethink the role of refugees in 
Bulgaria and other societies. The Bulgarian government has just adopted and is currently implementing a new 
legal framework for dealing with refugees. This report takes Bulgaria as a model country and aims to assess the 
impact of asylum seekers and refugees. As one of the few such reports written, and the first for Bulgaria, it is 
focused on the identification of costs related to refugees as they apply to the refugees themselves, to government 
institutions (not only those that deal exclusively with refugees but also those that have more or less remote 
input to the refugee process), and to non-governmental and international organizations. 
Bulgaria is a fitting sample country in which to start monitoring the impact of refugees: it had not had recent 
migration waves at the time of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo crisis; its number and flow of 
refugees is easy to observe; the country recently adopted a more comprehensive legal framework on refugee 
policy, which is in its implementation phase; and this is a convenient moment at which to derive lessons and 
rely on the currently positive attitude to the issue on the part of the authorities.  
The estimated total costs related to refugees in Bulgaria in 1999 were BGN 10,234,599, or USD 5,685,888. 
These costs are 0.046 % of estimated 1999 GDP. The government does not fully support the refugees. External 
donor assistance amounts to approximately 11% of the total costs of hosting refugees and asylum seekers. If 
our calculations are correct, the self-financing of refugees for 1999 was USD 3,866,667, or 68 % of the total 
costs. 
The country cannot influence the circumstances that lead to the influx of refugees. What remains to be done is 
to adjust policies in order to ensure a common benefit from these developments. 
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RATIONALE 
At the end of this century we are witnessing developments in the very foundations of the refugee flows in 
Europe and elsewhere. Wars, as well as ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts, are still the key events that move 
people from country to country and around the globe. But beneath these explosions of refugee waves, there is a 
current determined by the more routine work of economic and security forces.  
Not only the economy and trade but economic life itself as it is being practiced by millions of people has 
become international, with limited impact from nation-state boundaries and with a growing quest by capital 
and labor to make use of the best available opportunities as they emerge. National governments and 
international institutions are more reluctant to amend their respective labor market and social welfare systems 
than they are to facilitate global capital flows. To some extent this is due to the nature of things: capital 
movement is already accomplished digitally, while human beings move physically. To some extent, however, 
it is the degree to which policy is adhered to which matters. 
We also need to comprehend all of the consequences of the shift from territorial security to the security of 
human beings within various territories. When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all 
nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, ethnic cleansing, religious 
conflicts or social and political disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. 
Their consequences travel the globe, and some of those are great and small influxes of refugees.  
As a result, host countries take the responsibility for accepting refugees and helping them find their way 
further. While building a legal framework for tackling refugee issues, the host country suffers all the 
consequences stemming from the influx of refugees. Many problems related to refugees, such as their legal 
protection, social support for them, and their integration into the local society, have received considerable 
attention and have been intensively and extensively discussed. The impact of the presence of refugees on the 
economy of the host country, however, has not been considered. 
 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The legal status of refugees and asylum seekers is regulated by the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the 1967 
New York Protocol. According to these international documents, the internationally accepted definition of a 
refugee is the following: a person who, due to some events that have happened earlier, is afraid of persecution 
based on race, religion, nationality or membership in a particular social group or political convictions, who is 
outside his/her country of permanent residence, and for these reasons is neither able nor willing to avail himself 
of the protection of that country, nor to return to it. 
Persons whose situation corresponds to the conditions laid out in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and 1967 New York Protocol are recognized as refugees. Persons who apply for refugee 
status after having been abroad for some time are refugees “sur place” (when they left the home country they 
were not asylum seekers but the conditions in their country have deteriorated and they are afraid to go back). 
The Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol regulate the rights and duties of asylum seekers and 
refugees in the asylum country. Asylum seekers and refugees have the right to: asylum, protection from 
discrimination, free exercise of religion, personal status, applying for jobs, association, personal labor 
initiative, housing, medical care, social support, education and access to courts. 
Bulgaria ratified the Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol on April 22, 1992, and they came 
into force on August 10, 1993 and May 12, 1993, respectively. According to Art.4 and 5 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution, international documents ratified in Bulgaria become part of domestic legislation and take 
precedent over any national laws that are not in compliance with the international documents.  
The National Bureau on Territorial Asylum and Refugees (NBTAR) was founded on November 1, 1992, by 
Council of Ministers Decree ¹ 207. NBTAR was transformed into the Agency for Refugees on August 1, 
1999. NBTAR is responsible for the legal and administrative defense of refugees. On August 1, 1999, the 
Refugee Law came into force in Bulgaria. Under this law, refugees’ rights are guaranteed and Bulgaria carries 
out its responsibilities pursuant to the international documents.  
Humanitarian protection is granted to refugees who were forced to leave the country of origin because of war 
conflicts, civil violation and so on. It is granted for one year and can be prolonged for up to one additional year. 
  5
Recognized refugees have the same rights as Bulgarian citizens, with the exception of: the right to vote and to 
be elected, to join the army, and to take a post in the state administration. 
Bulgaria has singed readmission agreements with Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Switzerland, Poland, 
Lithuania, France, Portugal, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Hungary, Norway, Finland, Austria and 
Italy. Agreements with Slovenia, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg have been sighed but are not in force 
yet. According to these bilateral agreements, foreigners who do not enter on legal grounds can be returned back 
to the territory of the country from which they have come. In practice, Bulgaria is taking back foreigners who 
were in our country and went illegally to another country, in accordance with the readmission agreements.  
Protecting and assisting refugees is primarily a government responsibility. Signatories to the 1951 Convention 
are legally obliged to protect refugees according to the terms of the Convention without discrimination as to 
race, religion or country of origin, and to respect fundamental protection principles, such as non-refoulment 
and non-expulsion (which non-signatories to the Convention are also obliged to respect). Since refugees rarely 
have time to prepare documents or obtain visas before they seek asylum, signatory States may not penalize 
refugees for illegal entry into their territories, provided the refugees “…present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence” (Article 31).  
 
BULGARIA AND THE CONVENTION 
Immediately following ratifying the 1951 Convention in 1993, the Bulgarian State authorities were practically 
unprepared to meet its requirements and there was space for a lot of violations. In such a situation the minimal 
guarantees for the protection of refugees could only be assured by United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Liaison Office in Bulgaria (UNHCR Bulgaria) and its implementing partners – the asylum-related 
NGOs in Bulgaria. As it is known, the UNHCR is a non-political, humanitarian agency, whose mandate is to 
provide international protection to refugees and promote durable solutions to their problems. It does so by 
working with Governments and, subject to approval of the Governments concerned, with private 
organizations.  
The Statute of the UNHCR, adopted in December 1950, calls on the High Commissioner for Refugees to 
provide for the protection of refugees by, among other activities, establishing contact with “private 
organizations” (now known as non-governmental organizations, or NGOs) dealing with refugee questions and 
helping to coordinate the efforts of private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees (Chapter 2, 
No.8, sections H and I).  
Since the protection activitie s of NGOs follow the protection principles and practices of the UNHCR, it’s 
worth shortly mentioning what they include: 
· promoting the ratification and implementation of refugee conventions and laws; 
· ensuring that refugees are treated in accordance with recognized international standards of law; 
· ensuring that refugees are granted asylum and are not forcibly returned to the countries from which they 
have fled; 
· promoting appropriate procedures for determining whether or not a person is a refugee according to the 
1951 Convention’s definition and the definitions found in regional conventions; 
· assisting refugees in finding solutions to their problems, such as voluntary repatriation, local integration or 
resettlement to a third country;  
· helping reintegrate refugees when they go home; and 
· providing protection and assistance, when asked to do so, to internationally displaced persons. 
Apart from these activities, the Liaison Office of the UNHCR and asylum- and migration-related NGOs in 
Bulgaria – the Bulgarian Red Cross, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Future Foundation – have an 
important role to play as mediators between victims of trafficking, law enforcement agencies and other 
government agencies.  
 
POSITIONING BULGARIA IN THE REFUGEE FLOWS  
This report takes the Bulgaria as a model country to assess the impact of asylum seekers and refugees on the 
host country. As a sample country, Bulgaria has the advantage of having recently changed the legal 
environment concerning refugee and asylum seeker status. The number of all registered asylum seekers and 
refugees is relatively small (3,700 people for both categories combined). Equally important is the fact that 
Bulgaria, despite the changing international circumstances in 1999, such as the Kosovo crisis, has remained 
virtually unaffected by the refugee wave, while the crisis provoked an intense public debate and attempts to 
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elaborate a more informed understanding and a more sophisticated vision of the possibility of a refugee influx 
and its provisional impacts. The abovementioned general developments in the origins of refugee flows are 
better to be observed in Bulgaria: the underlying currents of refugees are not motivated by any extraordinary 
event or crisis. 
Most, if not all, EU member states and Central East European countries involved in the EU accession process, 
have become countries of immigration. Bulgaria is not an exception. What makes a country an immigration 
country is precisely its declared policies, based on needs, interests and humanitarian obligations. These needs 
and policies can vary over time, and there is a necessity to accordingly adjust conceptual, legal and institutional 
frameworks. In addition, they are part of an international constellation of circumstances and commitments. 
Evidence of international recognition of this necessity is the debate that has recently been gaining momentum 
on the need for a common set of EU immigration policies.1 The perspective of the individual non-EU countries 
that constitute parts of the EU-immigration routes needs to be established and communicated as a segment of 
the common solution to common challenges. 
Against this background it’s hard to expect that Bulgaria as a host country would have a positive, or receptive, 
migration policy, when Bulgarian citizens are often victims of restrictive EU migration policies. The different 
implications of this lack of migration policy are various: 
· there is a hierarchy of restrictive attitudes toward refugees and migrants legitimated by a quid pro quo, e.g.: 
if “the West” is restrictive against “us”, then “we” have the right to restrict others; 
· both asylum and immigration policies do not receive either popular or proper institutional support in 
Bulgaria; and 
· only asylum-related NGOs financed by external donors can break the vicious circle, providing services to 
stranded migrants who are staying in the country anyway.  
Clear immigration policies could clarify the differences between asylum and immigration. The main objective 
of refugee policies is the protection of persecuted individuals. Immigration policies aim to accommodate labor 
markets and demographic needs and to arrange for family reunion. Even if one pretends that it’s not of interest 
to the country, an unregulated and often irregular migration flow is a fact that needs to be addressed. Similar to 
the ways in which trade liberalization is accompanied by the application of trade rules and regulations, a 
migration regime should be established to manage the voluntary movements of persons. A comprehensive 
foreign policy should address the issue of forced migration. The asylum institutions in Bulgaria and in Europe 
would benefit from such policies, since part of the problem is lack of a balanced common immigration policies 
all over Europe. 
At the same time, Bulgaria is a fitting sample country in which to start monitoring of the impact of refugees: it 
had not had any recent migration waves, even at the time of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo 
crisis; the number and flow of its refugees is easy to observe; the country recently adopted a more 
comprehensive legal framework on refugee policies, which is in its implementation phase; and this is a 
convenient moment for deriving lessons and relying on the currently positive attitude to the issue on the part of 
the authorities.  
 
PRELIMINARY DEMOGRAPHICS 
It is likely that many of the most significant migration flows are not fully recorded because they are either of a 
very short-term nature, or they mainly concern persons who work in the informal economy.  
In 1998, the number of people who attempted illegal border crossing into Bulgaria was 2,651.2 In 1997, the 
number of persons refused entry at the border was 22,000, according to the International Organization for 
Migration’s report for 1999. The number of returned undocumented migrants during the same period was 526 
people, 18 of them under readmission agreements. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The research that provided the material for this report covers the period of the calendar year 1999, with the 
legal practice before the enforcement of the new Refugee Law (RL), when the old regulations were still in 
force, and the first months after implementation of the Refugee Law.  
The costs of hosting refugees are assessed on the basis of the present practice, and new approaches have been 
given in compliance with the RL. The assessments were made on the basis of the direct costs of all 
                                                 
1 Tampere meeting of October 15-16, 1999. 
2 See the International Organization for Migration’s 1999 Report. 
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refugee-related institutions and NGOs and also the estimation of costs of working hours as percentage of total 
working hours. Our intentions were to track, where it was possible, both the “visible” costs and those which are 
not so visible, as they appear throughout the stages of the refugee integration process.  
The preliminary assumption was that when thinking of refugee issues in Bulgaria, the first budget to come to 
mind is that of Agency for Refugees (AR), plus the contribution on the part of the UNHCR. Besides the costs 
to government institutions, which are easy to trace, contributions from NGOs and the refugees themselves are 
rarely taken into account. This also holds for the costs of government agencies that provide refugees with 
services of general, not specifically designed for asylum seekers, character.  
The costs are given in US dollars and Bulgarian leva (BGN), and the average exchange rate for the period used 
in all calculations was BGN 1.8 per 1 USD. 
The research is based on interviews with:  
· the government-authorized body responsible for the refugee status determination procedure: the Agency 
for Refugees (AR);  
· Border police officials at Haskovo and Petritch, which are major entry and exit checkpoints, with Rousse 
and Varna checkpoints used for reference;  
· Future Foundation transit centers; 
· the Bulgarian Red Cross;  
· the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee; 
· hospitals; 
· schools;  
· landlords, and 
· asylum seekers and refugees. 
When presenting the results below, we divide the costs according to their origin and institution. We have a 
government institution, AR, whose specific duty deals only with refugees, and institutions that provide 
services to refugees due to the fact they provide services to everybody (hospitals, schools, employment 
bureaus, etc.). There are costs necessitated by the refugee process but not taken into account as a specific 
refugee cost, e.g. costs of training the administration. Where possible we take these costs as part of the total 
costs as well. The costs of non-governmental and international organizations (UNHCR) are also taken into 
account. And last, but not least in terms of importance, are the costs of the process covered by the 
asylum-seekers themselves. 
We conducted 200 interviews, 130 of them with asylum-seekers and refugees. The questionnaires were 
designed to reflect the peculiarities of the respondents, and thus there were three: 
· a governmental institution questionnaire; 
· an NGOs questionnaire; and 
· a refugee questionnaire. 
The general logic of the questionnaires was based on the case study of a refugee, which is outlined below. 
To avoid misinterpretation due to differing knowledge of legal details on the part of the interviewees, foreign 
citizens who apply for asylum were called “refugees” during both stages: the refugee status determination 
procedure and the granting of refugee status as legally recognized refugees. In the interpretation, however, in 
order to make clear the difference between those refugees who are in procedure and those who already possess 
refugee status, we shall define the first category as asylum seekers and the second as refugees. According to the 
RL, all foreign citizens registered with the AR are “refugees” and we use the same terminology. 
In addition to interviews, we have studied the available documentation and government acts that provide 
information on refugee-related costs in Bulgaria.  
 
CASE STUDY OF A REFUGEE IN BULGARIA 
Refugee entry scenarios 
According to the Geneva Convention, the asylum seeker leaves his or her country because his/her life is in danger and for 
this reason he/she seeks entry into a safer country.  
The entry into the country of refuge can be legal or illegal.  
When crossing the border legally, the asylum seeker comes to the border crossing point and states that he/she desires 
asylum in the respective country. Border officers may decide to turn the foreigners back and not allow them to enter the 
country. Another possibility is that they may be detained by the border officers. The asylum seeker usually does not have 
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any documents, or has false ones. He or she speaks his/her native language or some common language. If it is necessary, 
border officers ask officials from the Agency for Refugees to come and interview future asylum seekers.  
While waiting to be interviewed, the provisional asylum seeker is kept in the detention rooms of the Regional Border 
Services, or, if there are no such rooms, in the border guards’ rooms. Those asylum seekers who have no documents are 
sent to the Center for the Temporary Detention of Adults in the Druzhba Region of Sofia.  
Most asylum seekers cross the border into Bulgaria illegally. If this is the case, there are three different options: 
· the asylum seekers are detained at the border while they are trying to cross the border (in these cases asylum seekers 
are detained at the RBS and they are transported to the transit centers of the Future Foundation);  
· the asylum seekers go to the Agency for Refugees themselves;  
· asylum seekers go to their friends and do not apply for registration at AR unless a problem occurs. 
 
Registration of the asylum seeker 
The Agency for Refugees is the government body authorized to make decisions about the granting of refugee status and 
asylum in the Republic of Bulgaria. Upon coming to the Agency, asylum seekers are registered and a refugee status 
determination procedure is opened. According to the RL the application for refugee status can be submitted to the 
Agency’s territorial structures, regional border services, regional passport and visa departments of the Ministry of 
Interior, or the diplomatic and consular authorities. The authorities interview the asylum seekers and write a report. If the 
competent bodies do not find the application to be manifestly unfounded, they issue a free travel document. Asylum 
seekers must go to the Agency for Refugees within a 24-hour deadline. All of the documents and the report are sent to and 
stored in the Agency’s individual file. At the Agency the asylum seeker is examined by a doctor and is blood tested. All 
asylum seekers receive a temporary refugee identity card, the validity of which is prolonged every three months, if 
necessary. They als o receive a Beneficiary Card, on which all assistance given to them is registered. Some asylum seekers 
who cross the border illegally come in at this stage of the refugee process, skipping the border police and Future 
Foundation transit center steps. Those have already been in the country for some time and later decide to apply for refugee 
status also appear at this stage. 
 
Housing 
Asylum seekers are accommodated in the AR dormitory in Sofia or the AR Reception Center in Banya, as well as private 
houses and apartments. Rent for the accommodations are paid to the landlords by the Agency for Refugees each month.  
If the asylum seeker wants to rent an apartment on his/her own, he or she must inform the Agency about the details of the 
change in his/her address.  
Unaccompanied minors are accommodated in the AR dormitory.  
 
Refugee status determination procedure 
There is an Interviewing Department at the Agency for Refugees where competent interviewers examine asylum 
applications, consider the country of origin information and apply it to the individual file and write a suggestion for a 
decision. No later than two months after the procedure’s opening, the Head of the Interviewing Department must prepare 
a report about the asylum application and give it to president of the AR and its attorneys. The president of AR must make 
the decision as to whether to grant refugee status within one month. The possible decisions are:  
· granting refugee status  –  the asylum seeker who is granted refugee status has rights equal to those of Bulgarians. The 
Agency for Refugees stops paying rent and monthly financial support for the recognized refugees and they can register 
at the Regional Labor Bureaus and Social Services or they are supported by Bulgarian Red Cross projects. 
· rejection of refugee status – the asylum seeker has the right to appeal the AR decision (Art. 65 of RL) before the 
Supreme Administrative Court (SAC). After final rejection the foreigners must leave the country no later than 15 days 
after the stated decision.  
· procedure is discontinued – the president of the AR discontinues the procedure for granting refuge status due to: 
voluntary return to the home country, voluntary discontinuation of the refugee status determination procedure, or 
disappearance during the procedure. 
 
Social adaptation and integration 
Those recognized as refugees and asylum seekers who are living in the country should be integrated into the society. The 
AR has a Social Adaptation and Integration Department, which organizes language courses and vocational training for 
asylum seekers and refugees. 
 
Entering the host country 
The interviews conducted with asylum seekers and refugees in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna and Haskovo indicate that the 
majority of them (52.5%) did not know anything about Bulgaria or Bulgarian legal practice and openly declared being in 
the country by accident or by mistake. In fact, they are detained by the Bulgarian authorities when crossing the country en 
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route to the promised land of Western Europe – i.e., most of the refugees in Bulgaria become refugees only when 
immigrants are detained at the Bulgarian border or are captured in the country without documents. In fact, it is likely that 
many people start their refugee career in Bulgaria as the result of an accidental constellation of events: their primary goal 
is the European Union, but on their way they are stopped for illegal passage by the authorities in a transit country, and, 
provided that the opportunity to return to their motherland is limited, they become asylum seekers. Some 39% of the 
respondents reported having had some preliminary information about how the Bulgarian government treats refugees 
before they encountered any Bulgarian authorities. 
A smaller part of the asylum seekers interviewed (16%) had lived in the country as students – most often studying 
medicine or engineering,3 and had only recently applied for refugee status. Others had started businesses here and then 
decided to remain in the country. Another source of refugee applications is that of immigrants who have succeed in 
crossing the border illegally. 
As a general conclusion, we think that empirical data we collected reveal a coincidence of two factors motivating asylum 
seekers: they come because of being endangered in their home -country, so they are eligible for provisional refugee status 
granted in accordance with the Convention; on the other hand, the country in which they are stopped for illegal passage 
might be an accidental one, e.g. Bulgaria or any other country on the general migration route. It is likely that the sooner 
Bulgaria improves its own standard of living and broadens its prospects for prosperity, the sooner it  will become a core 
immigrant destination. 
So, how do refugees get here? 
There are two scenarios that refugees follow when coming to the host country: 
· if detained at the border, refugees go through the scenario of the Future Foundation Transit Centers – the 
registration scenario – their entry is registered by the border police; 
· if not detained at the border, the asylum seekers enter the country and remain unnoticed until some problem 
occurs (breaking laws, attempting to leave illegally, deciding to legalize residency, to come out into the daylight, 
etc.) – the non-registration scenario. 
 
Demographics of refugees  
There were 3,700 asylum seekers and refugees registered by the first half of 1999, or 0.046% of the whole 
Bulgarian population. Male asylum seekers and refugees account for 2/3 of the total number of refugees and 
asylum seekers, while there are about 700 each of women and children. 
In a regional context the basic groups of asylum seekers and refugees originate from Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia, 
accounting for 3/5 of the total, and next  come groups from Iran and Turkey (as a transit country). 
According to the Agency for Refugees data, the religion breakdown of the refugees in the country is characterized as 80% 
Muslim and 20% belonging to different religious affiliations. 
The age structure of the refugee flow shows that the majority of people (45% of all refugees) are between 31 and 40 years 
old. The next group consists of people from 21 to 30 years (38%). This is to say that the two prevailing age groups consist 
of people of working age whose labor-force integration is essential to their making a living; i.e., refugees’ integration in 
the work force can be viewed as a vital necessity, especially when they intend to settle permanently in the country. Some 
refugees have their own funds available to cover their living expenses, but even in such cases the issues regarding their 
employment and social integration still remain. 
From the point of view of employment integration and adaptation, the quality of the incoming potential work force is of 
essential importance. The available data shows that refugees’ education level is relatively good: 39% of the recognized 
refugees have higher education; 54% have secondary education and 5% have only primary education. The prevailing 
share is that of people possessing secondary or higher education. Hence the expenses for training refugees who apply for 
refugee status and intend to settle permanently in Bulgaria will be oriented mainly toward Bulgarian language courses. It 
should also be considered that part of the applicants are people who have completed their higher education in Bulgaria, 
which makes training in the language unnecessary and in turn reduces the overall costs for language training. In fact, the 
important issue in this respect is the existing ma rket situation and especially the specific labor demand and the degree to 
which the latter can meet the needs of refugees, in accordance with their education and qualification.  
The 130 interviews reviewed the following occupational structure of the sample: 
 
Table 1. Professional Structure of Refugees in Bulgaria 
Type of profession Number 
of persons 
Percentages 
Merchants  7 7.6 
Military 1 1.0 
Students/Schoolchildren 9 9.9 
Salespersons 8 8.7 
                                                 
3 When a foreign citizen graduates from the Sofia Medical Academy, he/she has the same legal grounds to start 
professional experience as when graduating from European Universities.  
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Teachers 4 4.3 
Agronomists 2 2.1 
Journalists 3 3.4 
Tailors 2 2.1 
Engineers 6 6.5 
Other (mechanics, technicians, hairdressers, bakers, 
butchers, musicians, surgeons, designers, physicians) 
11 11.9 
Without any profession 39 42.5 
Total 92 100.0 
 
DESCRIPTION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE COSTS OF ALL INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED  
IN THE REFUGEE SCENARIO 
 
COSTS OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS  
Regional border services’ costs for serving asylum seekers  
The first government institution provisional asylum seekers encounter is the Border Police. We collected data 
from five Regional Border Services (Petritch, Lubimetz, Rousse, Varna and Sofia airport) about their costs 
incurred in serving future asylum seekers. There is no special RBS budget for serving asylum seekers but their 
duty is to provide food, medical assistance and everything needed for a 24-hour stay at least. All of the RBSs 
interviewed have similar cost structures regarding asylum seekers. 
 
Table  2. Border Service costs  
Border crossing points  Petritch 
RBS 
Kapitan 
Andreev
o 
Rousse Varna Sofia 
Airport 
Annual number of asylum 
seekers serviced 
500 50 50 50 10 
Annual costs of serving 
asylum seekers in BGN 
50,000 12,000 1,500 12,000 600 
UNHCR donation in 1998 in 
USD  
1,140  5,220  4,580 0 1,590  
 
In 1999, there was no specific item in the RBS budget to reflect the costs of dealing with provisional refugees. 
The table above is compiled from estimates by the teams and then confirmed by the RBS officials. The total 
costs at the five RBSs appear to be BGN 76,100 (or USD 42,278) from the central budget. The UNHCR 
contribution of a little more than 25% of the central government’s costs are for expenses for equipment and 
consumables. 
 
AGENCY FOR REFUGEES  
The Agency for Refugees (AR) is the government body authorized to grant asylum in Bulgaria. It is the 
transformed National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and Refugees (the Bureau). The Bureau was founded in 1992. 
The AR is responsible for financing all of the steps of the procedure, i.e. from the registration to the 
enforcement of the chairman’s decision (whether to grant refugee status or reject it), and its budget is part of 
the central government’s budget. The Agency for Refugees is a central budget-funded legal entity under the 
Council of Ministers. 
According to the RL, the Agency’s structure consists of a central office, transit centers, registration centers, 
receiving centers and integration centers. The AR is represented by a chairman, who has two deputies and a 
secretary. Currently, the AR is not yet structured in compliance with the RL.  
From 1993 until mid-1999 there were 3,678 asylum-seeking persons from 58 countries or without citizenship 
registered (780 of them children). A total of 1,935 decisions were made, with 524 persons granted refugee 
status, 376 persons granted humanitarian status, 261 persons’ applications rejected, and 774 cases 
discontinued.   
The following table shows the dynamics of the registered refugees and the decisions taken to determine their status. 
 
Table 3. Asylum seekers and asylum status decisions (1993-1999) 
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Year Number of 
applicants 
Number of decisions, including humanitarian 
status, rejections, refugee status 
1993 276 0 
1994 561 0 
1995 451 142 
1996 283 212 
1997 416 292 
1998 834 442 
1999 3,665 2,153 
 
The table proves that the institutional response to the refugee problem in 1998 and 1999 was more than 
appropriate. Since the Bureau was established, the efficiency of its decision-making has shown visible 
improvement. Most remarkable is the right-side column: while the number of applicants doubled between 
1997 and 1998, the authorities’ decisions almost doubled as well, thus equalizing the pace of decision-making 
with the influx of asylum seekers. Besides the fact that pending decisions remain significant, this is an 
indication of congruency between the numbers seeking refugee status and the speed of decision-making, while 
the efficiency of the latter only improved the following year. 
There are 1,743 “pending” cases. Currently, these persons are supported and sheltered by the Agency for 
Refugees. This number is conditional, because there are cases appealing negative AR decisions. On the other 
hand, there are asylum seekers who have since disappeared. Some of them left the country. The numbers of 
registered cases are as follows: 122 in 1996, 87 in 1997, or 21% of the asylum seekers listed the with AR. We 
did not have reliable data, so we considered the number of AR health-insured asylum seekers as the most 
correct list. The number of such persons was 1,000 as of the first six months of 1999. Further evidence of 
efficiency is shown in the fact that the number of registered asylum seekers in the first half of the year was 
about 200 people fewer than the number of decisions taken in the period, while in the previous years the former 
usually outnumbered the latter almost by a factor of two. Of course, since negative decisions and some 
procedures are being appealed, those appealing actually de facto still remain asylum seekers.  
 
Table 4. AR direct subsistence budget (Sofia office and Banya center, 1999) 
 Annual costs at 
Sofia Central 
Office, in BGN 
Annual costs at 
Banya Reception 
Center, in BGN 
Sofia costs in 
USD 
Banya costs in 
USD 
Registration, photos, 
Interpreters 
 67,025  2 975 37,236 1,652 
Housing 72,663 0 40,368 0 
Food 288,117 31,695 160,065 17,608 
Health insurance 20,232 0 11,240 0 
Medical care 9,097 903 5,054 502 
Social support  19,500 1,800 10,833 1,000 
Language courses  212 728 118 404 
Vocational training 0 0 0 0 
Education 0 784 0 436 
Social adaptation 0 0   
Electricity, water, 
heating, repairs 
165,000 11,000 91,667 6,111 
Total 641,846 49,885 356,581 27,714 
 
The combined budget for the direct costs of the Sofia and Banya centers is BGN 691,732, or USD 384,295. 
The figures in the table speak for themselves: direct physical needs and utilities consume over 90% of the 
budget. For this reason, perhaps, there is a demand for adjustment services provided to refugees by NGOs and 
the UNHCR. 
 
Table 5. Administrative costs of Sofia and Banya centers in 1999  
Administrative costs Sofia Reception 
Center, in BGN 
Banya Reception 
Center, in BGN 
Sofia  in USD Banya in USD 
Salaries 207,253 41,977 115,141 23,321 
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Maintenance costs for office 
and dormitory building; incl. 
water, electricity, heating  
166,000 11,608 92,222 6,449 
Administrative costs: phones, 
fax, supporting materials  
37,433 11,971 20,796 6,650 
Auto maintenance: insurance, 
spare parts, etc. 
55,200 5,249 30,667 2,916 
Long-term assets  308,988 1,254 171,660 697 
Business trips in the country 2,709 1,291 1,505 717 
Business trips abroad  25,540 0 14,189 0 
Staff training 700 100 389 56 
Guards 67,585 46,415 37,547 25,786 
Other  7,150 0 3,972 
Total 871,408 127,015 484,116 70,564 
 
It is clear that average direct subsistence cost per asylum seeker at the Sofia Central Office is 641.846 BGN 
(USD 365.58) per annum (641,846 BGN/1000 asylum seekers).  
The total direct and administrative costs of the Sofia center are BGN 1,513,254 (USD 840,697) and those of 
Banya are BGN 176,900 (USD 98,278). Administrative costs comprised almost 59% of the entire Sofia budget 
in 1999. The average total cost per asylum seeker was BGN 1,690.154 in 1999. In Banya, administrative costs 
were 72% of the total budget of the center, and annual costs per asylum seeker were BGN 5,307 (USD 2,948). 
There is little background to speculate on the rationality of concrete items in the administrative budgets. The 
total number of full-time employees, in Sofia and Banya combined, is 95. 
 
MEDICAL CARE AND ASSISTANCE FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES  
Medical assistance for asylum seekers and refugees is guaranteed by the RL, Article 25, which grants the rights 
of social support, free psychological assistance, health insurance, accessible medical assistance and 
free-of-charge medical treatment within the limits set for Bulgarian citizens. Before the RL’s enforcement, 
asylum seekers’ medial care used to be guaranteed by the National Health Law (NHL). The NHL Articles 3 
and 28 declares that citizens have the right to free-of-charge emergency and psychological assistance. Article 
27 states that foreign citizens and stranded migrants with permanent residence permits have the right to the 
same medical assistance as Bulgarian citizens.  
The 1994 Ordinance for Granting Refugee Status envisages free-of-charge medical assistance for asylum 
seekers. The AR’s employees have shared their difficult experience in implementation of the legislation 
regarding medical assistance for refugees: asylum seekers and refugees were treated as foreign citizens by 
hospitals’ administrations and were asked to pay for the services. The issue was solved by the nomination of a 
limited number of hospitals. The current shape of hospital accounting does not allow for concrete information 
from the balance sheets. For this reason, the estimated total medical costs are derived by a stylish calculation of 
prices and on assessments from indirect sources.  
 
 Table 6. Estimation of total medical costs 
Institutions and Hospitals Total costs in 1999 in BGN Total costs in 1999 in USD 
IHE and Regional Hospitals for 
initial tests 
47,939 26,633 
AR budget 9,097 5,054 
Reception Center Banya budget 903 502 
General Hospital in Nova Zagora 488 217 
VI General Hospital - Sofia 2,632 1,462 
TMI - Sofia 2,982 1,656 
Hospitalized cases at TMI 20,520 11,400 
Pediatric Departments 3,500 1,944 
UNHCR financial help to: 
Future, BRC and AR 
63,000  35,000 
Total 151,061 83,923 
 
These total costs do not include gynecologist, obstetrician or polyclinic visits. The total number of patient 
visits at VI General Hospital in Sofia was estimated to amount 600 people, and the average cost of one 
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patient’s visit was BGN 4.39 (USD 2.44). The total cost of serving refugee patients at TMI was BGN 23,502 
(USD 13,056); combined with the costs of the VI General Hospital these costs total BGN 26,134 (USD 
14,519). The number of patient visits and hospitalized cases was 440 people and the average cost of one case 
was about  BGN 54 (USD 30). If we include other medical institution costs and the contribution of the 
UNHCR, the total cost of medical services to asylum seekers in 1999 are estimated to have reached BGN 
151,061 or USD 83,923. 
 
EDUCATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES  
According to the RL (Article 25, Paragraph 5), during the procedure for granting refugee status the applicant 
has the right to continue his/her education until graduation from secondary school, in accordance with the 
procedures and conditions established by the AR and the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education 
and the Agency for Refugees share the responsibility for the enrollment of asylum seekers (and respectively of 
their children) in primary and secondary schools. Recognized refugees shall enjoy equal rights to education 
with all Bulgarians. Children of asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to free-of-charge primary and 
secondary education in public schools. Recognized refugees are supposed to pay only the amount which 
Bulgarian students would pay, not the higher fee for ordinary foreigners, though this is often not known to the 
academic institutions. Those refugees who came to Bulgaria as university students before 1989 and only later 
applied for refugee status and were recognized as refugees sur place due to a deteriorating political situation in 
their country of origin (in particular, refugees from Afghanistan) were partly allowed to finish their education, 
free of charge or with minimal fees, in order to graduate. UNHCR Bulgaria has provided 20 particular talented 
refugee students with scholarships for university and supported children with notebooks and other materials 
for the school year. According to the data given by the accountant at Sofia School 121, the average nine-month 
maintenance of a pupil from 1-8 grade, is 200 BGN.  
If the pupil is enrolled in a private school, the one-year school fee is around USD 1,500-2,000, including the 
food at school and transport. 
Estimation of the total education costs: 
 
Table 7. Costs of refugee education 
Schools and kindergartens Total costs in BGN Total costs in USD 
School costs  20,400 11,333 
Kindergarten costs  12,420 6,900 
BRC financial support  26,568 14,760 
DAFI program 56,993 31,663 
Total 116,381 64,656 
 
The teachers interviewed testified that the number of asylum seeker-pupils in schools is not constant. Most of 
them visit schools for one year and then leave. School authorities have no background information on their 
previous schooling and future education plans. 
Bulgarian pupils’ tuition is covered by the state budget, as is that of refugee pupils. The average monthly 
allowance per pupil is BGN 22-23 (USD 12-13). The refugee children first study Bulgarian and then go to 
regular schools. In the 1998/1999 school-year, the total number of refugee children identified by the Bulgarian 
Red Cross in primary and secondary schools was 102. In the kindergartens there were 45. The annual costs of 
education for these pupils totals 20,400 BGN (USD 11,333), or 102 pupils x 200 BGN, and for the 
kindergartners BGN 12,420 or USD 6,900 (45 children x 23 BGN x 12 months). 
The following difficulties in tutoring asylum-seeker pupils and children were identified in the interviews: 
· they do not constitute a regular stream of pupils; 
· they come from different countries; 
· they are at different ages; 
· they speak little Bulgarian language and there is a need for language lessons; 
· it is difficult to determine their level of knowledge needing special attention; 
· their parents pay little attention to the children’s tuition. 
We did not manage to identify to what extent these difficulties may contribute to the invisible costs of 
accommodating refugee pupils and children. We also do not have information on the Bulgarian language 
courses. It is likely, however, that they incur significant additional costs. Some interviewees indicated that 
additional hours spent with refugee primary school pupils by teachers are not remunerated. Consultations with 
teachers indicate that if a tutor is to meet the highest educational standards he/she must spend one-quarter more 
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time in order to provide the refugee pupil with the same quality of educational services. Although teachers do 
not have incentives to do so, the estimated additional costs are likely to amount to BGN 22,400 (USD 12,467).  
 
PASSPORT AND VISA DEP ARTMENT COSTS  
At the passport and visa department of the Ministry of Interior all documents of the asylum seekers and refuges 
are updated reflecting the meaning of their status change. The temporary IDs are issued at the AR, but the 
documents are processed and the information about each person is saved at the passport department, and 
updated if there is change of address or status. From January 1, 1999 until August 1, 1999, 6,292 
asylum-seeker and refugee documents were processed and the total Passport and Visa Department costs were 
BGN 376 (USD 209). The annual costs could  be estimated as BGN 564 (USD 313) (12 months x BGN 47). 
These costs are estimated on the one-month operator salary basis and the time spent by him/her to process the 
data. While the status determination procedure is going on, the asylum seekers do not pay any fees for issuing 
and processing of their IDs. 
 
POLICE SERVICE COSTS 
The Chef Directorate of National Police Service (NPS) has no budget for special services related to refugees. 
If, for instance, the regional police station at Ovcha Kupel provides services requested by the AR (located in 
the same region), policemen patrol around the neighborhood monitoring the public order. Policemen on duty 
visit the AR reception center if requested by the AR’s own security guard to assist in cases of: fighting, 
scandals, drunken persons among the asylum seekers, breaking the rules of the center, etc. There were also 
more serious conflicts, which incur additional, unplanned costs (e.g. there was a case when a fighting party was 
sent to the reception center in Banya. AR covered all of the transport costs). These costs are difficult to 
estimate but they must be taken into account as unforeseen ones, the availability of funds for which may 
prevent unexpected or undesired events. 
As Table 5 shows, in the AR budget for 1999 the costs for guard services were 67,585 BGN, and the respective 
costs at Banya reception center were 46,415 BGN. At the AR this service is provided by a private firm. There 
was an idea it would be carried out by the NPS, but there hasn’t been administrative progress on the issue. Part 
(it is difficult to identify the amount in concrete terms) of AR’s long-term assets are budgeted for security costs 
thus, probably, reducing the amount time that regional police station officers need to monitor public order at 
the AR. The chef officer of the NPS pays monthly visits to the AR reception center and makes an inspection of 
the center in terms of safety.  
 
SOFIA CENTER FOR TEMPORARY DETENTION OF ADULTS4 
The Center for Temporary Detention of Adults in the Sofia district of Druzhba (which means ‘friendship’ in 
Bulgarian) has a special arrest and incarceration structure. Foreign citizens who have no documents or whose 
documents are forged, as well as those who are criminals, are detained at the Druzhba center. Fugitives 
detained at the borders are also transported to the center for eventual expulsion.  
Upon coming to the Druzhba center the foreign citizens can complete an application to be granted refugee 
status if they want to apply for it. The application is sent through the Chief Directorate of the NPS to the 
Agency for Refugees and is filed there. Within a week, AR interviewers visit the asylum seeker. If the foreign 
citizen fulfills the requirements of the Geneva Convention as being a refugee, he/she is provided with a room at 
the AR dormitory or with a private apartment. Thus, the AR takes over the responsibility from the Druzhba 
center.  
From January 1 to September 25, 1999, 44 people previously detained at the Druzhba center were registered at 
the AR as asylum seekers. They spent 915 days at the center altogether. All costs for food, accommodation, 
medical assistance, and hygienic consumables, etc. were covered by the center’s budget. 
There is a doctor who comes daily to assist the detainees; there are also two health-officers, two kitchen 
servants, and seven police officers.  
 
Table 8. Estimated costs Center for the Temporary Detention of Adults  
 Costs* Total costs per month (BGN) 
Daily allowance 0.8 BGN per detainee per day x 9 
months x 10 detainees = 7,320 
811.33 
                                                 
4 Interview with the director of the Druzhba Center. 
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Electricity  1,500 BGN per quarter 500.00 
Water and utilities 253 per month 253.00 
Transportation  300 BGN for 9 months. 33.33 
Maintenance 6,000 BGN per 9 months 66.66 
Dry cleaning, washing, hygienic 
materials. 
200 BGN every 6 months 33.33 
Medical assistance costs  3 officers 720.00 
Paper and pens 30 BGN for 9 months 3.33 
Photographs  2.2 BGN x 900 for 9 months 220.00 
Telephone bill 10 phone conversations daily (not 
recorded) 
 
Salaries 11 officers 2,640.00 
Minimum average monthly costs  5,280.98 
*All information on costs is based on interviews and indirect sources (e.g. average salaries, etc.) 
 
The estimated annual costs of serving the people detained at the Druzhba center total BGN 63,371.76 (USD 
35,206.5). 
 
CASES OF REFUSAL TO GRANT REFUGEE STATUS  
In case of refusal to grant refugee status, the asylum seeker has the right to appeal the AR’s decision. The 
appeal should be filed within seven days with the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC). (According to the 
previous Regulations for Territorial Asylum and Refugees the term was 14 days, so the new regulations 
provide for a shorter procedure and presumably lower costs.) If the deadline is missed, the asylum seeker has 
no right to demand a new examination of the AR decision, and the SAC must find the appeal inadmissible. 
It is difficult to estimate SAC expenses. The judges are on full-time contracts and they get a fixed salary for the 
whole of their work. They hear many different kinds of lawsuits, including appeals of AR decisions. There are 
no statistics on the proportion of refugees cases among all of the cases before the SAC. The approximate salary 
of a judge is BGN 700-750 (USD 389-417) per month. A public prosecutor at the SAC receives a similar 
amount. In addition, there are expenses for interpretation during the court hearing, paid for by the budget of the 
court. This totals approximately BGN 20-30 (USD 11-16) per case. The approximate amount of time spent on 
asylum-seeker cases by SAC staff for the first sixth months of the year was 11% of the working hours of the 
judges and prosecutor (82 cases x 2 hours = 164 hours/ 6x 240 working hours). 
The AR’s costs of such cases are those for the lawyers representing AR – they are on labor contracts and they 
do not get extra payment – and the evidence presented if needed and available (it is in most cases translated during 
the refugee status determination procedure). In fact cases of refusal do not add new costs for the AR. 
 
Table 9.  Costs of appeals before the SAC 
Activities Total costs for the first 10 
months of 1999, in USD 
Total costs for the first 10 
months of 1999, in BGN 
Lawyers’ fees 9,840 17,712 
Interpreting costs when 
consulting with lawyer 
462 
(11 USD per case x 42 cases) 
8,316 
Evidence costs 2,240 
(28 USD per case x 80 cases) 
4,032 
SAC costs 1,372 
(11% x 2,496 
sixth-months-salary x 5 
judges) 
2,470 
Interpreting costs in the 
court 
1,760 
( 22 USD per case x 80 cases) 
3,168 
Total 15,674 28,213 
 
NGO SERVICES AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
Refugee-related NGOs (the Bulgarian Red Cross, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the UNHCR Liaison 
Office) support both government institutions, in their activity of hosting refugees, and the asylum seekers 
themselves. Each NGO provides services at some stage of the refugee process. Their costs are difficult to 
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identify with the desirable degree of integrity, because they often use volunteers and in-kind support, for which 
there is neither a tradition nor a standard for keeping accounts. The key information in this section is based on 
documentation from the UNHCR, which is the agency that supports most of the non-governmental activities. 
 
Future Foundation 
The Future Foundation’s staff members transport the asylum seekers from the border checkpoints to the 
foundation transit centers. From January 1 to October 30, 1999, 229 asylum seekers were served at four 
foundation transit centers. The future asylum seekers are accommodated for 5-15 days in the transit centers and 
then are transported to the Agency for Refugees in Sofia to begin the refugee status determination procedure. 
The foundation’s costs are mainly for food, transport, medical assistance and maintaining the transit centers.  
 
Table 10. Future Foundation costs  
Activities Total costs in 1999 in USD Total costs in BGN 
Transportation costs 11,094 19,969 
Direct subsistence costs 34,930 62,874 
Administrative costs 45,876 82,577 
Interpreters 8,000 14,400 
Small business loans 12,600 22,680 
Total  112,500 202,500 
 
The total costs of accommodating, sheltering, and consulting the asylum seekers at the transit centers are USD 
112,500 (BGN 202,500), while the annual average cost per asylum seeker is estimated to be USD 352 (BGN 
633). As the foundation’s transit centers are located at the borders, it is obvious that transportation costs 
comprise 10% of the total annual costs.  
 
LEGAL PROTECTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES : THE BHC 
The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee helps the asylum seekers via legal assistance, including representation 
before state bodies, the Agency for Refugees and the Bulgarian Red Cross. The predominant type of legal 
assistance given has been representation before the AR. BHC lawyers represented 229 asylum seekers during 
their interviews at the AR during the period of April-October, 1999. Over the same period there were 728 legal 
consultations, including consultations on asylum procedure, family law, Bulgarian citizenship, refugee status, 
small business, visa and travel documents. Three refugee women were enrolled in sewing courses under the 
“Income-generating” project of the BHC. The BHC’s 1999 budget for consulting costs was USD 20,064. The 
specificity of the BHC’s activity is that its legal assistance and protection are provided via the expertise of the 
BHC-Refugees’ and Migrants’ Protection Services (RMPS) experts. Thus, consultant costs, salaries, and 
translation costs are to be considered as direct costs on project implementation. 
The project’s exclusive financial support since the establishment of the RMPS of the BHC remains the United 
Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
 
Table 11. Bulgarian Helsinki Committee costs  
Activities Annual costs in USD Annual costs in BGN 
Consulting costs 20,064 36,115 
Salaries 25,080 45,144 
Translation 2,000 3,600 
Travel costs 1,800 3,240 
Small Business loans 1,200 2,160 
Operational costs 23,740 42,732 
Total 73,884 132,991 
 
The total number of asylum seekers and refugees served by the BHC/RMS during the first 10 months of 1999 
was 960. If we assume that the average number of asylum seekers and refugees served monthly is 96 people, 
then the average number of refugees consulted annually is about 1,250 people. In 1999 the BHC raised 
additional funds to the amount of USD 10,000 by publishing a newsletter.  
 
BULGARIAN RED CROSS (BRC) 
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In 1999, the BRC concentrated on work with recognized refugees and the more vulnerable groups of asylum 
seekers.  
The vulnerable categories of asylum seekers are given additional one-time or periodic financial support, in 
accordance with the Social Welfare regulations applicable to Bulgarian citizens. The BRC’s assistance is 
geared toward pregnant and lactating women, small children, single -parent families, elderly asylum seekers 
and refugees, and disabled refugees. The average number of asylum seekers and refugees assisted monthly 
varies during the year, and we would assume an average number of 400 people.  
Recognized refugees receive monthly cash assistance in accordance with a sliding scale, which is calculated on 
the initial basis of BGN 37.2; one month after receiving their IDs, the refugees receive 20% less, and six 
months later, 50% less than the basic sum. The total sum for family support costs in the 1999 BRC budget was 
36,000 USD. The number of recognized refugees assisted was as follows: 81 persons in January; 81 persons in 
February; 78 persons in March; 102 persons in April; 84 persons in May; 237 persons in June; and 168 persons 
in July.  
 
Table 12.  BRC costs funded by UNHCR 
Activities Annual Costs in USD Annual cost in BGN 
Transport tickets for 
recognized refugees 
2,250 4,050 
Supplementary allowance for 
refugees 
36,000 64,800 
Health/ Nutrition 26,700 48,060 
Social work services 46,300 83,340 
Education 18,360 33,048 
Issuing ID 3,600 6,480 
Agency operational costs 22,140 39,852 
Total costs 155,350 279,630 
 
The BRC has raised funds from non-UNHCR-funded projects, such as: the Summer Camp for Refugee 
Children with Intensive Bulgarian Language Training, funded by the Spanish Red Cross in the amount of USD 
7,426; Assistance in Kind for Recognized Refugees and Asylum Seekers, in the amount of USD 9,296 and 
Assistance to the Most Vulnerable Refugees, Migrants and Returnees of Bulgarian Origin, in the amount of 
USD 11,700, both projects financed by the Netherlands Red Cross. There was a donation from the charity 
foundation TAIBA of 150 food parcels and 150 hygienic parcels, which were distributed among asylum 
seekers or temporary residents from FR Yugoslavia. The total amount of non-UNHCR funding was in 1999 
USD 28,422. The BRC’s costs in 1999 were USD 183,772, and the estimated average annual cost per refugee 
is USD 29 (BGN 52). 
 
LOCAL INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES , A UNHCR PROJECT 
The UNHCR supports the governmental authorities and refugee-related NGOs, and the main objective of 
the1999 project is to assist them in developing the asylum system and applying it to legally and physically 
protect asylum seekers, refugees and other persons of concern to the UNHCR in Bulgaria. The Agency for 
Refugees, the Bulgarian Red Cross, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, the Future Foundation and the 
UNHCR Liaison Office are implementing the 1999 project goals through their programs. Its concrete aims are: 
to strengthen the operational capacity of the government’s refugee status-determination structure, to support 
NGOs in enhancing their capacity for advocacy and delivery of services, to ensure unhindered access to courts 
for asylum seekers and refugees, and to assist educational institutions in teaching international refugee and 
human rights. The border stations, passport police departments, AR structures, courts and refugee-assistance 
NGOs have been trained in regular workshops and seminars on refugee and asylum issues. In the UNHCRs 
1999 budget, training costs totaled about 79,000 USD, the sum including training supplies, the publication of 
training materials, interpreting and the rental of seminar facilities. The 1999 UNHCR project also included 
vocational training costs, funds for small business loans, fees for the services of legal experts from the academic 
sphere, surveys, and translation and publication of legal documentation. 
 
Table 13. UNHCR Liaison Office’s 1999 costs  
Activities Total costs in 1999, in BGN Total costs in USD 
Small business loans 36,000 20,000 
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Refugee legal 
protection 
131,368 72,982 
Agency operational 
costs 
28,458 15,810 
Total 195,826 108,792 
 
In 1999 the UNHCR’s financial assistance to the Agency for Refugees went toward the rental of houses for 
asylum seekers, food allowances, running the medical center at the AR and maintenance of the Reception 
Center in Banya. 
 
Table 14. AR costs funded by UNHCR 
Activities at AR supported by UNHCR funds in 1999 Costs in USD 
1. Transportation for asylum seekers living outside Sofia. 1,500 
2. Rental of houses for asylum seekers 70,200 
3. Food allowances for asylum seekers 42,000 
4. Running the medical center at AR 6,000 
5. Medicines and medical assistance 5,000 
6. Maintenance and supplies for Reception Center in Banya 20,000 
7. Fuel, maintenance, insurance for AR minibus 6,996 
Total costs 151,696 
 
The UNHCR’s financial assistance to the AR in 1997 and 1998 was earmarked for food for babies, renting 
houses, medical services, Reception Center refurbishment, upgrading the computer network, fees for the 
vocational training of asylum seekers and refugees and the local integration of refugee women. In fact, the 
UNHCR helped the AR at the stages of serving asylum seekers that were the most urgent in that period. The 
total costs presented in table 14 total 50% of the AR’s direct services budget for 1999.  
The UNHCR’s financial assistance to NGOs and the AR in 1999 totaled USD 602,222, with the breakdown by 
different organizations as follows: 
· BHC: USD 73,884; 
· BRC: USD 155,350; 
· FF: USD 112,500: 
· AR: USD 151,696. 
 
REFUGEE COSTS 
Costs borne by the refugees themselves can be distinguished as formal costs and informal costs. Refugee 
interview data reveals that some refugees and asylum seekers incur expenses of their own in entering into the 
country, registration at the AR and in being granted refugee status, and these are informal costs. The refugees’ 
formal costs are monthly subsistence costs, such as telephone costs and rent costs.   
 
Table 15. Refugees’ formal annual costs 
 Annual costs per 
refugee, in BGN 
Annual costs  per 
refugee, in USD 
Subsistence costs  4,320 
(360 x 12) 
2,400 
(200 x 12) 
Telephone call costs  1,200 
(100 x 12) 
672 
(56 x 12) 
Housing costs  1,440 
(BGN 120 x 12) 
804 
(USD 67 x 12) 
Total costs 6,960 3,876 
 
The total annual formal costs per refugee were BGN 6,960 (USD 3,876), and the total of refugees’ annual costs 
was BGN 6,960,000 (USD 3,876,000), assuming that the approximate number of asylum seekers is 1,000. 
 
Table 16. Refugees’ informal costs  
 Costs per refugee, in USD Costs per refugee, in BGN 
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Entry costs 200 360 
Registration costs 150 270 
Being granted refugee status 1,500 2,700 
Rent cost 67 120 
Total costs 1,917 3,450 
 
Costs to Other Government Institutions  
Under the implemented refugee regulations, border officers must be trained to serve asylum seekers. The costs 
of training border officers at the Institute for Officer Training and Research at the Ministry of Interior (Police 
Academy) are shown in the table  below. 
 
Table 17. Training costs  
Year Number of 
trainees 
Groups Costs for one group 
of trainees 
Total costs, in 
BGN 
1998/1999 41 Cadets 2 3,960 7,920 
 300 Listeners 12 3,960 47,520 
 Preparing the 
table 
 300  
 Total costs   55,740 
 
In 1999 the Police Academy’s training costs totaled BGN 55,740 (USD 30,967). 
As a result of the Kosovo crisis, the National Service of Border Police (NSBP) incurred costs by preparing to 
accept and serve the eventual asylum seeker influx. From March 23 until May 28, 1999, the total costs to the 
NSBP were BGN 91,869.232 (USD 51,038); these costs were for: 
 - office trips: 14,557.670 BGN; 
 - fuel and oil: 32,978.081 BGN; 
 - administrative costs: 5,831.643 BGN; 
 - staff food: 15,147.09 BGN; 
 - support materials: 1,287 BGN; 
 - army equipment and repairs: 693 BGN; 
 - communication sources: 5,001.970 BGN; 
 - spare parts: 14,661.778 BGN. 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS  
Refugee flows have not only an economic and a social, but also a financial, aspect at each stage of a refugee’s 
stay in the country, including the stages of employment and social integration. 
The present analysis will concentrate upon the specific costs necessary for refugee employment and social 
integration, as far as it is possible to separate these costs from the total costs for accepting refugees in the 
country, including the opening of a refugee status determination procedure and the granting or refusal of such 
status. 
As mentioned before, the following costs have been specified on the basis of tracking refugees’ movements 
after crossing the Bulgarian border: 
· Registration as a refugee 
· Opening a procedure for granting refugee status 
· Granting or refusal of refugee status 
There are different implications for the integration process, whatever the outcome of the procedure, for those 
who choose to stay in the country, legally or illegally. 
 
Employment integration of refugees 
The first steps mentioned in the preceding item seem unable to clearly outline the need to meet costs for 
employment and social integration, in as far as the process up to the moment of registration of foreign citizens 
as refugees stays “in the dark” and is quite individual. It is possible for a person to have stayed illegally in the 
country for some time before officially applying for refugee status. Meanwhile, they may have worked 
illegally if not in possession of their own funds. Obviously, in these cases the state cannot and does not provide 
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for them. It is hard to estimate these types of costs. In fact, there is lack of motivation for employment and 
social integration in the country on the part of the individuals in question, since they often cross the Bulgarian 
border on a transit basis on route to other Central European countries. There are two types of costs deriving 
from the existing legal procedures associated with the post-registration period, before receiving formal 
approval of refugee status and afterwards. 
 
Motivation for employment integration 
Within the refugee status determination procedure, the problems of employment and social integration, with 
the entailing costs, seem easier to outline more clearly. 
The motivation for employment and social integration is closely related with the necessity to provide a means 
of living. The variety of individual cases can be grouped as follows: 
· Individuals intending to study in Bulgaria; 
· Individuals intending to go on their way as refugees, only waiting here until they are granted refugee 
status, with a view to ensuring their legal travel to Central and Western European countries; 
· Individuals intending to stay permanently in Bulgaria, who have already been in the country or have 
relatives here. 
The variety of motivations for coming to Bulgaria and of future intentions shows that part of the refugees 
consider employment and social integration not to be essential, since their intentions to stay in the country are 
rather indefinite. Hence, their attitude toward the possibilities for employment and social integration will be 
different from that of people intending to settle permanently in the country. As far as motivation and intentions 
are associated with personal decisions and are not liable to legal classifications, the costs should be considered 
uniform for all cases. In this respect, part of the state’s costs for the employment and social integration of 
refugees is not economically justifiable. For another part of the refugees, the funds provided by the state for 
their employment and social integration are of essential importance, which may even predetermine some of 
their actions in the future. 
 
Employment integration costs 
During the period of the procedure for granting refugee status, the need for employment integration is very 
pronounced, since the individuals have minimal social insurance. In most cases when refugees lack their own 
funds for covering their living expenses or supplementing the state assistance, the individuals engage in labor 
activity. Since there are no precise legal regulations stating the possibilities for finding jobs through 
specialized institutions, at this stage refugees are used to working illegally. 
 
Possibilities for labor activities: 
1. Employment in the shadow economy – basic area of labor activities 
The labor activities of a considerable part of refugees undergoing the procedure are of a shady character. Most 
of them work in the Iliyantzi marketplace near Sofia, integrating into trade structures set up by foreign citizens 
or legally-approved refugees. The costs for exercising this type of labor activity are difficult to estimate. 
2. Running own business: 
· Refugees who organize businesses on their own: a number of refugees have graduated from schools in the 
country, and they use their former contacts and knowledge to risk self-employment and prosper on their own. 
In these cases the government does not bear any costs, while society benefits. 
· Refugees who receive financial support from UNHCR-sponsored programs to start a small enterprise: there 
have been 39 beneficiaries of such grants/loans, recognized refugees who received take-off support to start 
their own businesses.  
 
People with refugee status on the labor market 
As soon as refugee status has been granted, foreign citizens have equal rights with Bulgarian citizens, as far as 
labor issues are concerned. Their employment and legal relations are regulated by the existing labor legislation 
in the country. 
Under the conditions of a market economy the refugees, like all Bulgarian citizens, have to search for and find 
jobs on their own. There are many difficulties to face, and they are very much the same for all people, as long 
as the labor supply is rather limited in an economy in stagnation. People with refugee status encounter even 
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greater difficulties, and we would go too far if we claimed that they are equally placed in the labor market. This 
is due to several factors: 
· As foreigners they have to grapple with the language barrier and the original lack of a social network to rely 
on; 
· The possibilities for receiving the support of relatives and friends in a job search are smaller in comparison 
with those of most Bulgarian citizens, taking into account that operating through relatives and friends is a 
common practice in the country; 
· These people have no accumulated local employment experience, and while other conditions are more or 
less the same, Bulgarian employers would prefer their future employees to have relevant local experience and 
good knowledge of existing institutional relations. 
Hence, however equal vis-à-vis the law, recognized refugees may be considered as one of the marginal groups 
on the labor market. They should be supported and encouraged through specialized programs or general 
refugee policies for their employment integration. 
 
Refugees and regional labor bureaus (RLB) 
Asylum seekers have no legal grounds to interact with the labor bureaus and apply for jobs. That means that 
while the asylum seekers are undergoing the refugee status determination procedure the RLBs do not incur any 
costs serving them, nor finding jobs for them or enrolling them in training courses. The labor bureaus only 
serve recognized refugees. Between January 1, 1998 and June 1999, 32 refugee-status grantees were served at 
the regional labor bureaus. 
In 1998, 26 refugees were registered at RLBs. This totaled 0.006% of all registered unemployed people. 
In the first half of 1999, six refugees were registered, and this was 0.0012% of all registered unemployed 
people for that period. 
According to the National Employment Service (NES) database, the administrative costs of serving one 
unemployed person in 1998 and 1999 were BGN 39 (USD 22) and BGN 17 (USD 9.4), respectively. 5 
The total cost for the two-year period of services to unemployed refugees was BGN 1,690 (or USD 819.4, at 
the current exchange rate); for 1998 the total was BGN 1,262 (USD 717 at 1998’s average exchange rate) and 
for 1999 the total was BGN 428 (USD 238).6 
 
Table 18. RLB costs  
 1998 1999 
Total costs of serving unemployed people at the 
labor bureaus, not including the administrative costs 
of the National Employment Service 
18,347,932 
BGN 
8,536,247 
BGN 
Number of unemployed people  466,493 498,979 
Administrative costs per unemployed person 39 BGN 17 BGN 
 
According to interviews with RLB officials, refugees have been isolated from the employment system. NES 
policy is geared toward overcoming long-term unemployment. Programs of temporary employment have been 
realized for some concrete groups, such as: long-term unemployed (more than one year), young people without 
work experience, young people with less labor efficiency, and orphans, but these programs do not include 
refugees. It seems it is necessary to create programs in the labor bureaus for refugee employment. 
 
Comments on the information compiled from interviews  
For the period of 1998-1999, the number of registered unemployed refugees was 32 persons, 26 persons in 
1998 and six 1999, 66% of them male. These refugees have been registered on the basis of short-term 
unemployment, i.e. for a period up to one year. Among them the share of people with basic or secondary 
education is about 40%, and these are mainly female. This fact directs our attention to developing relevant 
programs for the employment integration of unemployed female refugees with low education levels, or 
educating them further and training them for appropriate work activities. The motivation for registering them 
                                                 
5 The difference in the costs for the two years is due to the fact that the labor bureau budget is confirmed at the end of the 
third quarter, while there are spent sources equal to 1/12 of  the costs of the previous year. 
6 For those bureaus where we have no data, we take the base administrative costs of BGL 40 in 1998. 
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as unemployed should be made clear in advance, since the main purpose of this registration might be just to get 
access to social assistance (social assistance is available if a person has been registered in the labor bureaus). 
The expenses for serving a refugee that are borne by the state, or more precisely by the employment offices 
within the Professional Qualification and Unemployment Fund, are of the same amount as for each 
unemployed Bulgarian in the country. There were three job placements of refugees on the initiative of the 
unemployment offices over the period mentioned. This amounts to 10% of all of those registered, which can be 
viewed as a comparatively positive ratio as related to the whole group of unemployed people in the country. No 
registered refugees have been reported to have taken part in active employment programs, training or 
retraining courses. 
The activities of the government institutions for refugee employment and integration must be reflected as follows:  
· The AR plays a key role in working with refugees, including for their employment and social integration. It 
has developed a program for vocational training and labor fulf illment, financed via a joint project with the 
UNHCR.  
· In 1996 a project was implemented in Bulgaria to set up an Integration Center for Refugees in Bulgaria. As 
a first stage, in 1997, the Female Refugee Integration Center was established. Its main functions have been 
targeted at social, professional, educational, psychological and health counseling. In the center a children’s 
play-and-study room and a community club have been opened. There are several specialized training units 
in the center, where female refugees are trained in computer skills, hairdressing, beauty saloon skills, 
typewriting, dressmaking, applied arts, etc. The skills acquired may be used later for developing small 
businesses or future employment. 
· A number of other organizations deal with refugee employment and social integration issues, but 
mediation and support on the part of the UNHCR and the AR are of vital importance for all programs. 
· The effectiveness of costs spent on refugees’ employment and social integration cannot be estimated 
separately, since these costs are part of the total costs of the projects. At the same time, these costs 
represent a considerable share in the total projects budget. For example, in the Local Integration of Female 
Refugees in Bulgaria Project (1998), the costs for trainers’ fees total one-third of the total project budget. 
· In 1997, the costs of the credit program for small businesses amounted to USD 8,000, which is twice the 
amount granted to businesses themselves. These costs represent about 10% of the total budget, and 
together with the training costs, amounted to 5% of the total costs for the year. 
· In 1998 the costs of the program for crediting the development of small business in Plovdiv amounted to 
USD 1,800. Together with the project costs for support for the economic activities of female refugees and 
credits for small business support, amounting to a total of USD 27,800, these costs represented about 2% 
of total budget for the year. 
· For 1999, vocational training course costs amounted to USD 10,000, and the funds in support of small 
business totaled USD 12,600. The proportion of these costs in the 1999 budget amounted to approximately 
2%.  
 
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES  
 
Motivation and costs for social integration of people undergoing the refugee status determination 
procedure  
Legal regulations set the amount of aid to every individual undergoing the refugee status determination 
procedure at BGN 35 (USD 19) per month. These allowances are minimal and cannot cover even the most 
basic living necessities. In addition, the state provides or rents lodgings for them, but it could be hardly claimed 
that normal living conditions are provided. During the same period state funds are provided for training in the 
Bulgarian language, as well as for medical services. 
People undergoing the procedure for granting refugee status are entitled to a single social assistance allowance, 
under the form of aid in cash or in products. These allowances are targeted to cover the most urgent needs of 
families with many members or families with chronically ill members, and the needs of children, pregnant 
women and lactating mothers. The allowance is delivered by the AR on the basis of the refugees’ application 
for assistance and the agency’s social survey data. 
 
Table 19. Assistance to asylum seekers  
Year Social assistance in cash –  
number of aid allowances  
Assistance in products –  
number of aid allowances  
1995 338 136 
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1996 43 397 
1997 620 399 
1998 165 187 
1999 
(Jan.-Aug.) 
86 264 
 
Motivation and costs for social integration  
As soon as foreign citizens are granted refugee, status they have equal rights with Bulgarian citizens in relation 
to social assistance, as provided for in the Social Assistance Act (SAA) and the Decree for Birth 
Encouragement (DBE). The municipality social assistance services are in charge of providing social assistance 
to individuals having refugee status. As mentioned above, the system of social assistance in Bulgaria is in the 
process of reform. One of the aspects of this reform includes enforcing precise criteria for access to the services 
of social assistance and support for socially vulnerable people. At the same time, the pressure on the system is 
rather high due to the dramatic impoverishment of the major ity of Bulgarians during the transition period. 
Under the circumstances, refugees who have already acquired asylum status are legally on equal terms with all 
Bulgarian citizens; still, in practice they receive social assistance or access to social services only after meeting 
rather restrictive criteria. 
 
Table 20. Social assistance costs for refugees, as per Regulation for Applying the Social Assistance Act 
(RASAA) and Decree for Birth Encouragement (DBE) 
Year Number 
of 
RASAA 
cases 
Type of family 
(members) 
Total amount 
in BGN, 
according to 
RASAA 
Numbe
r of  
DBE 
cases 
Type of family Total amount 
BGN, 
according to 
DBE 
 
1996 
 
 
1 
 
1 member 
 
314.000 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
1997 4 1 - 1 member 
1 - 4 members 
1 - 5 members  
1 - more than 5 
424.026 3 cases 1 - 4 members 
1 - 5 members 
1 - more than 5 
185.717 
1998 23 4 - 1 member 
3 - 3 members 
7 - 4 members 
5 - 5 members  
4 - more than 5 
1,776.629 2 cases 1 - 5 members 
1 - more than 5  
274.190 
1999 10 3 - 1 member 
2 - 2 members 
1 - 3 members 
1 - more than 5 
1,859.860 1 case 5 members 68.735 
 
 
TOTAL COSTS 
Summarizing all of the data collected by all governmental and non-governmental institutions, we can estimate 
the total refugee-related costs for 1999.  
 
Table 21. Total costs of hosting asylum seekers and refugees. 
Institutions Total costs in 
BGN in 1999 
Total costs in 
USD in 1999 
Border police:  
Petritch 
Lubimetz 
Rousse 
Varna 
Sofia 
 
50,000 
12,000 
1,500 
12,000 
600 
 
27,778 
6,667 
834 
6,667 
333 
Agency for Refugees (AR) (incl. 
Banya reception center costs) 
1,690,154 938,975 
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Banya reception center costs) 
Hospitals  88,061 48,923 
Education   53,221 29,567 
SAC costs (excl. BHC lawyer’s 
fees) 
10,501 5,834 
Passport and Visa department 564 313 
Druzhba Center 63,372 35,207 
Regional Labor Bureau  428 238 
Social Services  1,929 1,072 
Training costs 55,741 30,967 
National Service of Border Police  91,869 51,038 
Future Foundation 202,500 112,500 
Bulg. Helsinki Committee (BHC) 150,991 83,884 
Bulg. Red Cross (BRC) 330,790 183,772 
UNHCR funding of AR 273,053 151,696 
UNHCR Liaison Office 195,826 108,792 
Refugees’ own annual costs 6,960,000 3,866,667 
Total  10,234,599 5,685,888 
 
The estimated total costs for 1999 were BGN 10,234,599, or USD 5,685,888. These costs equal 0.04% of 
1999’s estimated GDP. The government does not fully support the refugees. External donor assistance 
amounts to approximately 11% of the total costs of hosting refugees and asylum seekers. If our calculations are 
correct, the self-financing of refugees totals USD 3,866,667, or 68 % of the total costs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS , CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Challenges 
It is normal that population movements in an integrated world should increase. To the extent that Bulgaria 
integrates itself with the EU, or simply because of its geographic predisposition, it is becoming an immigrant 
destination. Related to this there are democratic and economic developments, posing at least the following new 
challenges:  
· further liberalization, respect for human rights, higher democratic standards, enhanced implementation of 
international obligations and sustained openness of the economy are required, but while economic 
activities are essentially of international, or even global nature, social welfare system and commitments 
undertaken via international agreements (financed by taxes) are based on national jurisdictions; 
· in 1999 and 2000, Bulgaria is to completely liberalize its capital account, which in pragmatic terms would 
allow citizens, including those granted asylum status, to open bank accounts and transfer funds abroad; 
these developments would contribute to the attractiveness of the country as an immigrant destination but 
also would facilitate its position as a transit point; 
· being a community of the highest living standards and of a social security-based welfare system, the 
European Union is a territory of almost complete liberty of capital and population (labor) flows within its 
boundaries, and of severely restricted migration from outside the union; the political rhetoric supporting 
this restrictive policy uses as its arguments two ‘sacred cows’ – employment stability and preventing 
imported crime;  
· as an EU accession country, Bulgaria attracts people from the more vulnerable regions of Central Asia and 
elsewhere, but due to its own low living standards, legacies of the past and problems intrinsic to the 
transition process (contraction of investment and GDP, dismantling of the Socialist welfare system, weak 
contract enforcement and public order mechanisms, etc.), it is subject to EU restrictions on human capital 
flows and is expected to maintain similar protectionist measures toward human influxes from outside the 
larger integrated Europe; 
· at the same time, in this situation no internal refugee policy can prevent the influx of people, whether the 
final destination is Bulgaria, a neighboring country or the EU itself, as no policy can isolate the country 
without dragging its economic and prosperity prospects to the worst years of the recent or more remote 
past; the policy challenge is rather to involve the newcomers to Bulgarian society in a joint pursuit of 
growth and prosperity. 
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Conclusions  
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the country (or the state budget) is not a net contributor to refugee 
accommodation costs. The estimated total 1999 costs in BGN is 10,234,599, or USD 5,685,888. These costs 
are 0.046% of the estimated 1999 GDP. The government does not fully support refugees. External donor 
assistance amounts to approximately 11% of the total costs of hosting refugees and asylum seekers. If our 
calculations are correct, the level of self-financing of refugees is USD 3,866,667, or 68% of the total costs. 
Our findings related to AR costs suggest that the future of AR development must be channeled toward 
reducing the duration of the refugee status determination procedure. According to the RL, Article.56, the 
procedure should last three months, or in some cases, the AR Chairman can prolong the procedure for an 
additional three months. This actually means that the number of asylum seekers undergoing the procedure 
cannot exceed the number of newly arrived asylum seekers in the last six months. Of course, we must also bear 
in mind the amount of time needed for the procedure of appeal at the SAC, which does not depend on the AR. 
The appeal procedure is also prolonged, and this fact entails additional government, refugees’ own, UNHCR 
and NGO costs for supporting those asylum seekers who are still undergoing the procedure. Cutting down the 
appeal deadline in accordance with the RL would curtail all these costs. As the number of refusals to grant 
refugee status account for 7% of all registered applications, according the recent practice, the whole appeal 
procedure is completed within 18 months. 
The refugee integration and social adaptation issues can be analyzed according to different aspects, such as: the 
rate of openness of the local labor market to the foreign labor force and the expected impact on labor market 
equilibrium; government costs of integration of the foreign labor force; costs of integration of foreigners and 
the related problems. During the years of transition, the local labor market has experienced serious cuts in labor 
supply and demand for local work force. The level of unemployment in Bulgaria has not dropped below 10%. 
The restructuring of the economy brought about a change in employers’ attitude toward the qualifications of 
the local work force. People with secondary school and higher education constitute a considerable share of 
newly-unemployed people. There has been a sharp drop in job openings for professions with traditionally high 
ratings, such as engineers, economists, doctors, teachers, etc. The situation now is the following: the demand 
for labor with higher and secondary education is rather limited, as seen from the labor demand lists of the 
NES’s monthly registers. Refugees may offer skills which are already abundant on the supply side. This 
situation has been well recognized by the refugees themselves. In interviews they share that job seeking is 
basically very difficult in Bulgaria. The limited information we have on refugees who become successful 
entrepreneurs suggests that their contribution to the economy is based on diversity rather than on advantages in 
general skills. Labor market liberalization and the reduction of the entry barriers for doing business constitute 
a prerequisite for enhanced utilization of domestic and ‘imported’ (refugee) entrepreneurship. Under similar 
conditions, refugees may contribute to lower prices for unskilled labor. 
At the same time, the refugee issue in Bulgaria does not constitute a serious problem for the social sector or the 
labor market. It is likely that the situation would be similar in any other country that is not affected by an 
extraordinary refugee wave and, like Bulgaria, has an intermediary position between regions that are 
vulnerable in economic and security terms and regions that offer abundant economic opportunities. 
The system of labor market and social assistance has the capacity to receive the refugee influx within the 
framework of the standard services provided by the state as means of assistance and programs for employment 
and social integration. The costs for the employment and social integration of refugees as a relative share of the 
total budget costs did not represent a significant part of the total costs for the last three years – it has barely 
reached 5% of the total budget. This is indicative that other activities regarding refugee services make up most 
of the costs. Administrative costs that are part of the overall budget have to be considered, too. Activities 
aiming at employment and integration during the refugee status determination procedure are very limited. The 
period is rather long, sometimes up to five years or even more. Meanwhile, these people cannot work legally, 
according to local legislation. Thus, they are denied the alternatives of work force choice and have to join the 
shadow economy. At the same time, procedural efficiency was improving rapidly in 1999. 
The number of refugees in Bulgaria seems not to contribute significantly to the poverty rate. Official agencies 
do not measure it. They determine the minimum wage and eligibility for social assistance line, which for the 
last five years has been kept at the level of 50% of the minimum wage, which is currently about USD 37 per 
month. This is the systemic foundation for determining refugee allowances, as well. According to this 
criterion, no more than 4.07% of Bulgarian households were below the poverty line in 1997. The most 
authoritative data on this issue is provided by the World Bank survey on Bulgarian Poverty During the 
Transition, published in June 1999. In this survey, poverty is defined as a percentage of average per capita 
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consumption, at two levels: a lower poverty line at 50% of average consumption and a higher poverty line at 
66.7% of average per capita consumption. The survey estimates that under the higher poverty line, the 
proportion of population in poverty rose from 5.5% (approximately 450,000 people) to 36% (approximately 3 
million people) in 1997 alone. During the same period the proportion under the lower poverty rate grew from 
2.9% to 20.2%. The inconsistency of the data does not allow for compilation of the poverty rate prior to 1995.  
The major reason for increased poverty was the decline in consumption and GDP, which was 10.0% in 1996 
and 6.9% in 1997. Respectively, better economic performance would cure poverty better than a policy based 
on increased income inequality. According to the methodology of FAO and WHO (using calories of 
consumption), between 23.9% and 34.7% of Bulgarian households were below the poverty line in the most 
severe year, 1997. According to the methodology of the Bulgarian Ministry of Labor, based on assumed norms 
of calories of consumption, square meters of flat and consumer basket items, and used in 1997 to determine 
two poverty criteria, 52.9% to 84.1% of Bulgarian households were living in poverty that year. Most of the 
estimates suggest that female -headed households have higher poverty rates male -headed households. The 
above-mentioned World Bank survey estimates that the ratio here is 40.4 female - to 35.4 male-headed 
households (median for 1995-1997).  
From the same survey there are several more thought-provoking findings. The generational group exposed to 
the highest poverty risk is children; while they represent 21.05% of the population, their poverty rate is 
44.26%. The older generation, i.e. over 55 years of age, has a poverty rate of 35.32%, while they constituted 
29.65% of the total population in 1997. Bulgarian Turks (8.5% of the population in 1997) had a 40% poverty 
rate, while 84% of the Roma in the country (6.5% of the population) were in the same condition that same year. 
There is no consistent survey of the poverty rate on an annual basis. Given the fact that minorities are more 
exposed to poverty risks, it is likely that refugees share such risks at a level similar to these groups. 
The social integration of asylum seekers has been limited to providing minimal means of living. Besides 
language education and sporadic attempts to associate foreign citizens with local communities, the overall 
support basis for adjustment needs is negligible. This is one of the reasons why even after being granted 
refugee status, people continue to have serious social integration problems, since the existing social assistance 
system is rather insufficiently developed and is incapable of offering different schemes for social integration to 
both the ‘domestic’ poor and socially weak refugees. 
 
General Policy Options  
If the refugee status determination procedure is shortened or put under some more clear time limits, the 
resources freed from those procedural-related costs could be allocated to social adaptation and integration 
activities, or channeled toward building up administrative capacity. 
The AR staff, first of all, is occupied with both the refugee status determination procedure and the social and 
everyday necessities of asylum seekers. Under the conditions of shortened procedure time (three months), the 
asylum seekers might end up in a social vacuum. So far, during the refugee status determination procedure the 
asylum seekers have managed to learn the Bulgarian language, get acquainted with the local culture and life, 
and plan their future economic activities. A three-month procedure term is too short for a person who is in a 
country for the first time, does not speak the local language, and whose views are far from the culture and life 
of the local population. The integration of recognized refugees is the major issue which will draw more and 
more attention from refugee-related professionals and institutions. Due to different institution-building 
priorities, refugee employment and social adaptation prospects have not been analyzed in any detail.  
As soon as individuals acquire refugee status, their employment integration level does not differ from that of 
Bulgarian citizens. At this stage of labor market development, this implies rather limited chances of obtaining 
employment and rather meager services for job seeking and job placement on the part of local employment 
offices. Despite equality before the law, there are a number of conditions which place refugees in a difficult 
position in relation to employment possibilities. Hence refugees should either be covered by specially 
earmarked employment/integration programs or “left on their own”.  
The policy option here is based on the following circumstances: due to different reasons, it is likely that many, 
at least two-thirds, of the refugees in Bulgaria choose to go the informal route. Targeted employment programs 
have not been sufficient at larger than refugee scales. Both refugees and non-refugees would benefit more from 
liberalized labor market rules than from employment programs that are limited in number and poorly tailored. 
“Leaving refugees on their own” would then rather mean: 
· clear and unquestionable terms of procedure; 
· clear subsistence terms; 
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· allocation of scarce resource to adaptation needs, not to fancy employment programs; 
· clear limits on government involvement and liberty for non-governmental organizations to come in between. 
With a view to better understanding and management of refugees’ impact on the host country’s economic 
situation, employment and social integration, it is essential to carry out regular monitoring of the situation. 
This monitoring must be initiated by the AR and be realized through the employment office network and the 
National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria, in cooperation with international and non-governmental organizations. 
  
Employment and Integration Policy Option 
Most of the data suggest that the liberalization of the labor market, the priority allocation of resources to adjustment 
activities, and the adoption of policies based on “leaving refugees on their own” could make a difference.  
